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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Greg Feldberg
By Sarah Ward and Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of
Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the
global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced
by the commission and why its report is important. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an
interview with Mr. Feldberg.
There is always a time constraint and a resource constraint that has to be addressed
upfront or nothing will get done.
Feldberg was hired on the research staff of the FCIC in January 2010, six months into its
mandated 18-month period and right as it was scheduled to begin public hearings. Although
the infrastructure had been set up, little had been accomplished in the way of substance. He
immediately began to help the Director of Research identify the expertise needed and
aggressively recruit people to the research team.
At least nine or ten were like him, Feldberg says, detailees from federal agencies that paid
their salaries while they worked on the Commission (Feldberg was a detailee from the
Federal Reserve). He said, “[o]ne of the first things I did upon getting there as a Fed detailee
was to call up the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and other regulatory agencies and ask if they had any detailees to send over.”
Recruiting detailees helped streamline the process of securing the needed expertise but
didn’t cure all the manpower challenges. “We could have always used more folks to help,”
says Feldberg. “Even though we had access to anybody in the academic or financial
community to share their wisdom with us in interviews, just getting people with real
background and expertise on the issues on staff was extremely valuable.” A similar tactic was
used to secure investigators, Feldberg said, “The investigation teams were lawyers and
people from investigative agencies like the SEC and even the U.S. Postal Service and FBI.”
Subpoena power was a powerful tool that gave the commission a once-in-a lifetimeopportunity to gather data and document information about the crisis.
In May, Feldberg was elevated to the position of Director of Research, where he was
responsible for a research team composed of economists, financial analysts, people from
financial agencies, and people from the private sector. He viewed the commission’s role as
documenting the history of the crisis, not just the things that had been reported, but the
hidden details that no company wanted known. Feldberg describes how he viewed his role
and how the commission went about its work:
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For every hearing, we had an investigative team assigned to investigate the company
whose CEO would be speaking, and we had the research team lay out the issues that
would be discussed at the hearing and provide information. The investigative team
was producing two investigative reports that were confidential prior to each hearing
and would help the commissioners know what to ask. And the research team was
producing two public reports. When I started, I was part of this frantic effort to
generate two research reports a month on complex financial issues.
When he assumed the Research Director role Feldberg saw a unique opportunity to enhance
the reports:
The first thing I really focused on . . . was to back up our research efforts with a bunch
of data projects. I thought we could take advantage of our subpoena power to collect
data that nobody else was ever going to collect from the financial institutions that
were involved.
Feldberg believed that providing the supporting data was the only way to ensure that the
commission and the public really understand what had caused the crisis.
However, given the limited time and resources, Feldberg emphasized that “[w]e had to pick
our targets to some extent because we couldn’t do a deep dive on every single company.” We
had to “focus the hearings on the topics we thought were important,” Feldberg said. Given
these constraints he explained, decisions were made to examine an industry by proxy, such
as investigating Moody’s to examine rating-agency activities.
The Commission obtained information from important participants in areas of the financial
industry that were largely unregulated and for which financial regulators had limited
information about prior to the crisis. An example cited by Feldberg is a survey of hedge
funds:
[W]e managed to collect detailed information from hedge fund advisors that
controlled more than a trillion dollars of assets in more than half the hedge fund
industry. We collected data on market risk from market participants in the short-term
funding markets, an area that was subject to run-risk that hadn’t been understood
before the crisis. The survey covered the dealers, insurance companies, mutual funds,
money market funds, and any and everybody involved in that.
Another commission project that Feldberg is particularly proud of is a meticulous “in-depth
profile of one mortgage-backed security where we relentlessly subpoenaed every company
that was involved.” The result was The Story of a Mortgage Security: Inside CMLTI 2006-NC2,
a step-by-step history from June 9, 2006, through September 2010 that “show[ed] what was
going wrong at every stage from the origination of the loan all the way through to the
mortgage-backed security and how it [got] divided up for investors into collateralized debt
obligations or CDOs.” In the final report, Feldberg relates, The Story of a Mortgage Security
was repeatedly referred to as a concrete example of changes in underwriting standards that
contributed greatly to the crisis.
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Seeking out and reporting on what was unknown when the project started was one of
the commission’s most critical tasks.
According to Feldberg, telling the whole story of the crisis also meant debunking
misinformation that existed. He illustrated by commenting on the predominant
understanding of the crisis as it unfolded:
[T]here was the housing bubble, which was fueled by funding from the GSEs (Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae). A lot of countries around the world had housing bubbles, driven
largely by macro forces. The housing bubble was in full force in ’03, ’04, and ’05. It
peaked in late ’05 and early ’06. If all you had was a housing bubble financed by the
GSEs, you wouldn’t have had the financial crisis.
Feldberg discussed how much of the commission’s work was focused on going beyond the
housing bubble and crisis to ferret out and identity the other factors that made this crisis
different and so severe. That involved, among other things, focusing on the increase in
demand for risk transfer products, the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit
default swaps (CDSs), that became so popular starting in ’05, and through ’07, and the
reasons why and how this second “weird structured finance bubble in which housing assets
and mortgages were bundled into CDOs and CDSs and ABCP” occurred.
The Story of a Mortgage Security report, Feldberg said, delved into this in a detailed way and
laid bare processes that previously had not been public. In its final report, the commission
criticized government agencies, including the Fed, for poor supervisory oversight in the runup to the crisis.
When asked about potential conflicts of interests among the staff, Feldberg replied, “I like to
think we were hired for our expertise and our ability to dive into these issues, and that the
commission never thought that those of us that came from agencies were there to represent
or defend our agencies.” The commitment to report fully and accurately, he concludes,
resulted in a fairer and more credible report.
Gathering information is one challenge, writing the report presents another.
When asked how he settled on the structure of the commission’s report, Feldberg described
it as trial and error. The challenge, he said, was to synthesize all the information that they
had collected into a report that would be readable for policymakers, financial professionals,
and the public. He elaborated on how the process evolved:
[The first idea was] to have one journalist write the whole thing, but that was just too
much. Then we shifted to having more experienced writers pair up with a couple of
junior folks to write large swaths of it, but that turned out to be too unwieldy. Then
we hired four journalists to take different sections of the report. That idea really stuck
in the sense that one journalist wrote the first part pretty much on her own using the
resources we had. Another journalist wrote the final chapter, which focused on the
aftermath of the financial crisis.
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The structure of the bulk of the report—the second through fourth parts—wasn’t settled on
until September. Feldberg recalls:
I was sitting in my office reading through some of the interviews and other materials
that we had, trying to figure out what happened to the investment banks after the
Lehman failure, and I started writing a section on Morgan Stanley. I wrote a thousand
words and it got across what happened to Morgan Stanley and I decided we should
write the whole report in one- to two-thousand-word pieces. I divided the whole
story into little pieces and assigned them out, and that’s the way it ended up being
organized.
The most important value of the report is telling the story as completely and as
accurately as possible.
Feldberg stresses that he and other staffers were charged with telling the whole story of the
crisis with its many nuanced details, as much as possible. “Our goal was to write the
definitive account of the crisis and why it happened, one that would stand the test of time.”
He feels that they succeeded by several measures. One measure of that success is that “[t]he
report is widely cited. It's widely considered to be the definitive account of the crisis.”
Another is that it debunks some falsely held beliefs. For example, it describes how the crisis
was caused by two bubbles, a housing bubble (which by itself probably would not have led
to the massive crisis that occurred) and then a structured finance bubble, which by 2006
“was driving the mortgage market, an example of the cart driving the horse. There was so
much money available for mortgages that the demand helped drive down underwriting
standards.”
According to Feldberg, focusing on just the housing bubble and underwriting standards
would not have been sufficient. It was the combination of the two bubbles that lead to the
crisis. Many people saw the housing bubble coming ahead of time, but few if any saw the
structured financing bubble developing. “Nobody saw the collapse of the short-term
wholesale deposit funding market that happened in 2007 coming,” Feldberg explains. “The
way that risks had been packaged into exotic CDO (collateralized debt obligations) and CDS
(credit default swaps) products was not something that people were talking about in ’05 and
’06.”
To that end, Feldberg believes that the report clearly identifies these practices and products,
and others that contributed to the crisis. He specifically sees the value of the commission’s
work and the report as providing a narrative of those factors that made this crisis different
from other crises, and supporting those conclusions with facts. He emphasized, “The data
projects we did supported in new and innovative ways what we had been learning in the
course of our work.”
When asked about the criticism the report received because the commissioners did not reach
a consensus, Feldberg pointed out that the commissioners disagreed in their conclusions for
various reasons:

53

Lessons Learned: Greg Feldberg

Ward and Wiggins

[The Republicans] didn’t want to hold any specific type of product, or specific type of
market, responsible. Similarly, they didn’t want to say there was anything wrong with
existing regulations, because they didn’t want their words to be used to satisfy any
regulatory agenda at all.
On the other hand, Feldberg says, the Democrats were “trying to provide the basis for
legislation.”
Feldberg further comments that the staff had little control over the commissioners’
conclusions, but he remains confident that the staff succeeded in its role to “do the report
and do the analysis.”
When asked what his dissent would be, Feldberg responded,
I supported the majority conclusions. They were generally in the right direction, but
I found them very high-level. I found a lot of them to be the kind of things you could
have said about any financial crisis. There was poor supervision and risk management
all around. And people indulged in short-term thinking. If I were to write a dissent, it
would focus much more on making sure that people understood what was special and
different about this crisis, such as the design of financial products and how the system
was allocating risks in really screwed-up ways. I didn’t feel as if the majority or the
dissenters did that in the way I would have done it.
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